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Background: On 31 March 2013, the first human infections with the novel influenza A/H7N9 virus were reported in
Eastern China. The outbreak expanded rapidly in geographic scope and size, with a total of 132 laboratory-
confirmed cases reported by 3 June 2013, in 10 Chinese provinces and Taiwan. The incidence of A/H7N9 cases has
stalled in recent weeks, presumably as a consequence of live bird market closures in the most heavily affected
areas. Here we compare the transmission potential of influenza A/H7N9 with that of other emerging pathogens
and evaluate the impact of intervention measures in an effort to guide pandemic preparedness.
Methods: We used a Bayesian approach combined with a SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Removed)
transmission model fitted to daily case data to assess the reproduction number (R) of A/H7N9 by province and to
evaluate the impact of live bird market closures in April and May 2013. Simulation studies helped quantify the
performance of our approach in the context of an emerging pathogen, where human-to-human transmission is
limited and most cases arise from spillover events. We also used alternative approaches to estimate R based on
individual-level information on prior exposure and compared the transmission potential of influenza A/H7N9 with
that of other recent zoonoses.
Results: Estimates of R for the A/H7N9 outbreak were below the epidemic threshold required for sustained
human-to-human transmission and remained near 0.1 throughout the study period, with broad 95% credible
intervals by the Bayesian method (0.01 to 0.49). The Bayesian estimation approach was dominated by the prior
distribution, however, due to relatively little information contained in the case data. We observe a statistically
significant deceleration in growth rate after 6 April 2013, which is consistent with a reduction in A/H7N9
transmission associated with the preemptive closure of live bird markets. Although confidence intervals are broad,
the estimated transmission potential of A/H7N9 appears lower than that of recent zoonotic threats, including avian
influenza A/H5N1, swine influenza H3N2sw and Nipah virus.
Conclusion: Although uncertainty remains high in R estimates for H7N9 due to limited epidemiological
information, all available evidence points to a low transmission potential. Continued monitoring of the transmission
potential of A/H7N9 is critical in the coming months as intervention measures may be relaxed and seasonal factors
could promote disease transmission in colder months.
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An outbreak of novel A/H7N9 influenza virus infections
rapidly unfolded in Eastern China, with the first
laboratory-confirmed case identified in Shanghai on 31
March 2013 and a total of 132 laboratory-confirmed
cases and 38 fatalities reported as of 3 June 2013 [1,2].
Although the number of new A/H7N9 cases has stalled
since early May 2013, several features of this virus have
heightened concerns for its pandemic potential and
prompted an intense public health response from the
Chinese authorities and international health organiza-
tions. Foremost, the rapid progression of new cases in
urban centers in April 2013 and the severity of the
disease have been worrisome. Although the exact route
of transmission remains unclear, current evidence points
to frequent spillovers from a yet-to-be-confirmed avian
reservoir, suspected to involve poultry [3-6]. Although
genetic analyses of the novel virus have revealed poten-
tial signs of adaptation to mammalian hosts [7], to date,
sustained human-to-human transmission has not been
established through contact tracing analysis [3,4] but
cannot be ruled out. About 23% [4] of the A/H7N9
patients report having no prior exposure to live animals,
underscoring the potential role of transmission by the
environment, aerosols and undocumented contacts with
infected individuals. Further, recent experimental studies
indicate that the A/H7N9 virus is able to spread effi-
ciently among ferrets via direct contact, although air-
borne transmission is less efficient [8].
A particular cause for concern is the fact that poultry
infected with the A/H7N9 virus seem to exhibit relatively
mild symptoms [9], which may extend the infectious
period in this host. This is in stark contrast to highly
pathogenic A/H5N1 influenza viruses, which typically kill
poultry within a few days. Silent and undetected A/H7N9
infections in poultry increase the likelihood of zoonotic
infections which, in turn, enhance the potential for
acquisition of sustained human-to-human transmission
properties.
Preliminary studies suggest a low incidence of A/H7N9
infection in chickens and pigeons in affected areas [1,5].
Nevertheless, live bird markets were preemptively closed
and sick birds culled since 6 April 2013 in Shanghai and
16 April 2013 in Zhejiang, which may have slowed down
the progression of the outbreak [10]. A quantification of
the rate of viral transmission to humans and the effective-
ness of intervention measures would be particularly useful
to guide public health responses and provide a compre-
hensive risk assessment of the A/H7N9 threat.
The reproduction number, R, is a key epidemiological
tool for assessing the transmission potential of an emer-
ging infection and monitoring the likelihood of large-
scale outbreaks. Estimates of R >1 signal the potential
for an emerging pathogen to generate a major epidemicwhile R <1 indicates that transmission chains cannot be
sustained in the population.
In the case of an emerging infection, obtaining near
real time estimates of R is essential to guide intervention
strategies. Bayesian estimation approaches [11-13] are
naturally well-suited for situations where epidemio-
logical data are gradually accumulating, due to their
flexibility to incorporate prior information. In these
approaches, prior information is sequentially updated as
more complete outbreak data become available, provi-
ding posterior distributions of the epidemiological para-
meters of interest [11-13]. In contrast, more traditional
‘epidemic curve fitting’ approaches have been typically
used to provide retrospective estimates of R once the out-
break is over [14-19]. Alternative estimation approaches
are based on detailed individual-level information on prior
exposure to suspected animal reservoirs and/or contact
with infected patients [20-22].
In this report, we estimate the transmission potential
of the influenza A/H7N9 virus by relying on daily official
notifications of laboratory-confirmed cases in mainland
China. In particular, we focus on assessing whether the
progression of the outbreak is consistent with unsus-
tained human-to-human transmission dynamics in line
with R <1 and whether intervention measures may have
reduced transmission. Further, we compare R estimates
for A/H7N9 with those for other zoonotic pathogens
that have recently caused pandemic concern.
Methods
Data sources
We used official notifications of laboratory-confirmed
A/H7N9 influenza cases reported in mainland China
from 1 March to 20 May 2013 to the Chinese Center for
Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) through a
national surveillance system. For each of the 130 cases,
we obtained the exact date of symptoms onset, the
province of residence and whether the patient had recent
exposure to poultry or live bird markets. None of the
records had missing information on residence location or
onset date. We focused our analysis on Zhejiang and
Shanghai provinces, where the majority (60%) of cases
have been reported to date. A plot of the daily A/H7N9
epidemic curve is provided in Figure 1.
Ethics
The dataset of laboratory-confirmed cases of avian influenza
A H7N9 infection was part of a continuing public health
investigation of an emerging outbreak and was, therefore,
exempt from institutional review board assessment.
Estimation of the reproduction number R
We adopted a sequential Bayesian framework com-
bined with a susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed
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Figure 1 Temporal incidence of laboratory-confirmed A/H7N9 influenza in the provinces of Shanghai and Zhejiang according to date
of symptoms onset (n = 78). Vertical dashed lines indicate the timing of the preemptive live bird market closure in Shanghai (6 April) and
Zhejiang (15 April), respectively. Cases are color coded by exposure history.
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A/H7N9 [11,12,23]. Here, the theoretical R value is a
fixed (unknown) quantity, and R estimates are upda-
ted in a sequential Bayesian framework as data accu-
mulate over time. This approach was previously
applied to study the dynamics of the A/H5N1 influ-
enza outbreaks in Asia [23], the 1918 influenza
pandemic in San Francisco, USA [12], and the 2009
A/H1N1 influenza pandemic in China [24]. In this
model, the population is assumed to be well-mixed.
Susceptible individuals (S) come in contact with infec-
tious individuals (I) and progress to the exposed stage
(E) with an average latency period of k-1 days. Ex-
posed individuals (E) then progress to the infectious
stage (I), with an average infectious period of γ-1
days. Both the latent and infectious periods are as-
sumed to be exponentially distributed.
This model assumes that all A/H7N9 cases origin-
ate from human-to-human transmission and, hence,
provides an upper bound on the transmissibility of
A/H7N9. We also conducted simulation studies to
assess the performance of this approach in the situation of
an emerging pathogen, where most human cases are due
to spillover events originating from exposure to an animal
reservoir or the environment, and human-to-human
transmission is limited [See Additional file 1].
In the Bayesian SEIR approach, we use a relationship
that is directly applicable to time series data as it
expresses the expected number of new cases over the
time period τ (for example, τ = 1 day) as a function of
the number of cases in the previous time period, givenwith prior epidemiological information. The relation
follows from a standard SEIR model [11,23]:
E C t þ τð Þ½  ¼ b R; γ; κð ÞC tð Þ; ð1Þ
where E[C(t + τ)] is the expected number of new cases
at time t + τ, b(R, γ, κ) defines the progression of cases,
γ-1 and κ-1 are the infectious and latent periods, respect-
ively, and C(t) is the observed number of new cases at
time t. The progression operator is given by:
b R; γ; κð Þ ¼ exp λþτ½ ; ð2Þ
Where λ+ is the dominant eigenvalue derived from
linearization of the SEIR model around disease-free equi-
librium, following [15]
λþ ¼ κ þ γð Þ2 −1þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1þ κγ
κ þ γð Þ2 R−1ð Þ
r" #
: ð3Þ
In this approach, both the latent and infectious periods
(1/γ, 1/κ) are fixed and, hence, the only parameter to be
estimated is R. We made two different assumptions for
the latent and infectious periods to illustrate a short
infection process consistent with seasonal influenza [25]
(k-1 = 1.5 days and γ-1 = 1.5 days, so that the generation
interval is 3.0 days) and a longer infection process in line
with descriptions of the prolonged course of A/H7N9
infections in humans (k-1 = 3 days, γ-1 = 3 days, so that
the generation interval is 6.0 days) [4,5,26].
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We formulate the model in discrete time probabilistic
form to account for the discrete nature of the influenza
case data and estimate the distribution of R using Bayes’
theorem.
The distribution of new incident cases C(t + τ) follows:
C t þ τð Þ∼R C t þ τð Þ←C tð Þ Rj ½ ð4Þ
which states that C(t + τ) only depends on the number of
new cases at the previous time point C(t), given R. Using
Bayes’ theorem, the updated posterior distribution of R at
day t + τ follows:
P R½ jC t þ τð Þ←C tð Þ ¼ P½C t þ τð Þ←C tð Þ Rj P R½ 
P C t þ τð Þ←C tð Þ½  ð5Þ
where the denominator is a normalization factor. Hence,
Equation (5) defines the sequential Bayesian estimation
scheme, where the posterior probability distribution of R
can be used as a prior to generate a posterior distribution
at the next time step.
We have to set an initial prior on R to initialize the
sequential approach at t = 0, which can reflect any a
priori knowledge of the disease. Based on preliminary R
estimates derived from the exposure history of A/H7N9
patients (see below), we assumed normal distributions
centered around 0.2 (SD = 0.2) and 0.5 (SD = 0.2) as
initial priors for R; both distributions were left-truncated
at 0. We also consider a more extreme prior center
at R = 1 in Additional file 1.
To compute numerically the posterior of R at each
daily iteration, we use Equation 5, relying on the poster-
ior from the previous day as the new prior, following
[11,12]. The posterior R distribution was evaluated using
1,000 discrete bins between 0 and 1.5.
Simulation studies
We carried out simulation studies to evaluate the perfor-
mances of the Bayesian sequential estimation method in
the context of an emerging pathogen. Specifically, we
simulated A/H7N9 influenza outbreaks using a modified
SEIR transmission process including different levels of
human-to-human transmission (as measured by R) to-
gether with spillover events originating from a hypo-
thetical reservoir. We varied the true R in the range 0.1
to 2.0 and modeled spillover events as a constant daily
rate of new infections arising from exposure to the res-
ervoir (α, in the range 1 to 10 infections per day). We
used the model to simulate daily outbreak data, ap-
plied the Bayesian estimation method to these data,
and confronted the estimated R with the true R [see
Additional file 1].
These simulations were designed to gauge the level
of error associated with neglecting transmission fromenvironmental or animal sources in our main Bayesian
estimation approach, and also to assess the sensitivity of R
estimates to prior distribution assumptions, under differ-
ent epidemiological scenarios.
Variance on case series of A/H7N9 influenza
The SEIR transmission model imposes a requirement on
the mean of A/H7N9 cases, but variance can be modeled
in a more flexible manner. Because we are dealing with
disease count data, the most general choice is the
Poisson distribution, where the mean equals the vari-
ance. As sensitivity analysis we considered a Negative
Binomial distribution which allows for greater variance
and better accounts for over-dispersed data, and assu-
med the variance to be twice the mean.
Estimating the impact of live bird market closures
To estimate the impact of live bird market closures in
the most affected provinces of Shanghai and Zhejiang,
we fit an exponential curve with intrinsic growth rate r
to the daily case time series in the pre-intervention
period (before 6 April). We used a Negative Binomial
log likelihood fit to account for over-dispersion in case
counts. The 95% confidence intervals on the growth rate
were determined from the range of values of r that yield
log L = log L_max - s^2/2 where s = 1.96, and L_max is
the value of the likelihood at the best-fit value of r [27].
Using the exponential model fit up to 6 April, we
forecasted the expected number of A/H7N9 cases in
subsequent weeks. We confronted the progression of
reported cases past 6 April against that predicted by the
pre-intervention model as an indication of the effective-
ness of control measures.
Reproduction number estimates based on individual-level
exposure data
As a complementary method to estimate the R for influ-
enza A/H7N9, we used an approach recently developed
by Cauchemez et al. for zoonotic infections [20]. In this
approach, R = 1-p, where p is the estimated proportion
of infected patients arising from direct contact with the
A/H7N9 reservoir (scenario 1 in [20]). This approach
provides a conservative upper bound on R as it assumes
that case detection probability is independent of cluster
allocation (while in general, once an index case is identi-
fied, other infections in the family are more likely to be
detected). This is a reasonable approach when human-
to-human transmission is low [20].
An alternative approach to estimate R relies on the
average size of chains of human-to-human transmission,
as R can be estimated by dividing the number of secon-
dary infections occurring within clusters by the number
of primary cases with a direct link to the reservoir [21].
Although there is uncertainty in the exposure history of
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virus, and cluster sizes and frequency, we can use R esti-
mates based on exposure and contact information
[22,23] to set the initial prior distributions for R in our
Bayesian estimation scheme.
Finally, we provide a comparative review of the trans-
mission potential of emerging zoonoses using both
individual-level contact tracing and exposure data and
transmission model fitting approaches, with a focus on
avian influenza A/H5N1, swine influenza A/H3N2v,
seasonal and pandemic influenza, Nipah virus and severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
Results
Influenza A/H7N9 epidemic curves
Figure 1 illustrates the course of the A/H7N9 epidemic
by date of symptom onset in Zhejiang and Shanghai0
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Figure 2 Epidemic curve and sequential Bayesian estimation of the d
China. A) Daily number of laboratory-confirmed A/H7N9 influenza cases b
the preemptive live bird market closures in Shanghai (6 April). B) Evolution
serial interval of six days (latent period, k-1 = 3 days and infectious period, γ
(dashed red lines) are shown. The horizontal dotted line indicates the thres
R, reproduction number.provinces from 19 February to 26 May 2013. Overall,
71.4% (50/70) of the influenza A/H7N9 cases reported
in these provinces were associated with exposure to
poultry and/or live bird markets (Figure 1). Figures 2
and 3 present the progression of the outbreak separately
in Shanghai (n = 33) and Zhejiang (n = 45). The inci-
dence accelerated around 27 March 2013 in Shanghai
(the first of three consecutive days with non-zero cases),
and approximately two weeks later in Zhejiang on 8
April 2013.
Reproduction number estimates based on the Bayesian
sequential approach
The Bayesian sequential estimation approach revealed that
the Shanghai and Zhejiang A/H7N9 data were most
consistent with a R around 0.1, with broad 95% credible in-
tervals (0.01 to 0.49) excluding 1 (Table 1). The progressionnghai
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Figure 3 Epidemic curve and sequential Bayesian estimation of the distribution of R for the A/H7N9 influenza outbreak in Zhejiang
province, China. A) Daily number of laboratory-confirmed A/H7N9 influenza cases by date of symptoms onset. Vertical dashed lines indicate the
timing of the preemptive live bird market closures in Zhejiang (15 April). B) Evolution of R estimates as data accumulate over time, assuming a
prolonged serial interval of six days (latent period, k-1 = 3 days and infectious period, γ-1 = 3 days). Median R (solid red line) and 95% credible
intervals (dashed red lines) are shown. Horizontal dotted line indicates the threshold at R = 1, above which large epidemics are expected to
occur. R, reproduction number.
Chowell et al. BMC Medicine 2013, 11:214 Page 6 of 13
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/11/214of updated R estimates as data accumulate over time is
shown in Figures 2 and 3 for each province; there was no
significant change in estimated R as the outbreak pro-
gressed from February to May 2013 in either location. The
prior and posterior distributions for R are compared in
Figure 4 and reveal a moderate change as the outbreak
progresses, suggesting that there is relatively limited infor-
mation in the A/H7N9 case data.Table 1 Estimates and 95% credible intervals of the reproducti
Parameters
Zh
(k-1 = 3 days and γ-1 = 3 days) 0.1
(k-1 = 1.5 days and γ-1 = 1.5 days) 0.1
R estimates based on the sequential Bayesian estimation SEIR method, prior to theSensitivity analyses and simulation studies
A sensitivity analysis on the prior distribution for R con-
firmed that there was high uncertainty in the posterior
estimates of R [see Additional file 1: Figure S1]. How-
ever, the posterior mean of R and upper 95% credible
interval remained below the epidemic threshold (R = 1)
as epidemiological data accumulated, no matter the
prior. Further, estimates were robust to assumptionson number, R, for the A/H7N9 influenza outbreak in China
R estimate (95% CI)
ejiang Shanghai
3 (0.01 to 0.46) 0.15 (0.01 to 0.47)
1 (0.003 to 0.42) 0.17 (0.01 to 0.49)
start of control interventions on 6 April 2013.
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Figure 4 Comparison of prior and posterior distributions for the reproduction number, R, associated with the A/H7N9 outbreak in
Zhejiang (top) and Shanghai (bottom), using the sequential Bayesian SEIR estimation method. Sequentially obtained posterior
distributions are based on data up to 15 April, immediately prior to the first closure of live bird markets, and up to 20 April, two weeks into the
intervention period. We assume a serial interval of six days (latent period k-1 = 3 days and infectious period γ-1 = 3 days). The initial prior for R is
a normal distribution left-truncated at 0 and centered at 0.2 (SD = 0.2). SEIR, susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed.
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file 1: Figure S2].
Next, we simulated outbreak data illustrating the
spread of an emerging infection, where human cases
originate from both human-to-human transmission and
direct contact with a hypothetical reservoir. Simulations
indicate that the Bayesian estimation approach tends to
overestimate R, especially when the true R is low and
spillover events are frequent [see Additional file 1:
Figure S3]. However, the upper bound of the credibleinterval of the Bayesian approach was trustworthy, as it
remained below 1.0 whenever the true R <0.6. Further,
case data from Shanghai and Zhejiang suggest that the
reported rate of spillover transmission from the reservoir
was in the order of approximately one daily infection in
the pre-intervention period, which is in the lower (and
more favorable) range of our simulations.
Importantly, simulations show a substantial change
between prior R distribution (centered at 0.2, as in our
main analysis) and posterior R distributions, when the
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/11/214true R is above 0.6 [see Additional file 1: Figure S3]. This
suggests that if the true R was above 0.6 for A/H7N9,
we would have detected a greater change in posterior
distribution than we did in the observed outbreak data.
Finally, our simulation studies indicate that the proportion
of A/H7N9 patients arising from human-to-human trans-
mission is approximately equal to R, when 0.1 ≤ R ≤0.9
[see Additional file 1: Figure S4].
Additional sensitivity analyses considering longer latent
and infectious periods did significantly change R estimates
(Table 1). Similarly, assuming a Negative Binomial to
model over-dispersion in A/H7N9 case data did not
significantly affect our estimates [see Additional file 1:
Table S1, Figure S2].
Impact of intervention measures
To gauge the impact of preemptive bird market closures,
we analyzed temporal trends in cumulative daily A/H7N9
incidence by fitting an exponential curve to data for the
combined provinces of Shanghai and Zhejiang, in the pre-
intervention period 1 March to 6 April (Figure 5). Our
results indicate a statistically significant (non-zero) intrin-
sic growth rate at 0.101 case/day (95% CI: 0.070 to 0.143).
The model can be used to predict disease incidence past 6
April had there been no intervention. We note a deceler-
ation in growth rate of observed cases past 6 April, outside0
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Figure 5 Predicted progression of cumulative laboratory-confirmed A
(n = 73 cases) according to dates of symptoms onset, in the absence
confidence intervals. Predictions are based on an exponential model fit to
prior to live bird market closures, and using a negative binomial distributio
prediction of the model fit past 6 April. Black dots indicate the progression
the preemptive live bird market closures in Shanghai (6 April) and Zhejiangof confidence bounds predicted by the pre-intervention
model (Figure 5). In particular, the model identifies a
statistically significant departure from predicted incidence
by 18 April and throughout the end of the study period. A
similar pattern was obtained by using nationally aggre-
gated incidence data instead of province-level data [see
Additional file 1: Figure S5].
Estimates of the reproduction number for A/H7N9 using
alternative approaches
As a complementary analysis, we present R estimates for
A/H7N9 based on alternative approaches relying on
individual-level information on prior exposure and con-
tacts with infected patients [20,21].
Among the 130 A/H7N9 patients reported by 26 May
2013, in mainland China, three family clusters ranging
in size from two to three were identified, with onset dates
between 11 February and 21 March [see Additional file 1,
Table 2; see also [4,28]]. Of the 130 cases, 67% reported a
history of poultry exposure (88/122; eight have unknown
exposure information), including 47% of patients who
visited live bird markets (37/79, 51 unknown). Based on
the proportion of new infections presumed to arise
directly from the poultry reservoir [20], we can estimate R
is approximately 1–0.67 = 0.23 (Table 2). An upper bound
for R is provided by assuming a stricter definition of03
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of reported A/H7N9 cases. Vertical dashed lines indicate the timing of
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Table 2 Comparison of reproduction number estimates for the A/H7N9 influenza viruses, other emerging zoonoses
with pandemic potential, and human influenza viruses
Outbreak R estimate Source and method
A/H7N9 outbreak
Avian influenza A/H7N9- 2013, China 0.1 (95% CrI: 0.01 to 0.49) This study; Bayesian approach from [11]
Avian influenza A/H7N9- 2013, China 0.03 to 0.05 This study; exposure-based approach from [20]
Avian influenza A/H7N9- 2013, China 0.28 (95% CI: 0.11 to 0.45) Analysis of cluster size distribution from [22]
Other zoonotic influenza viruses
Avian influenza H5N1 -2003 to 2006, SE Asia and Egypt/Turkey 0.29 Cluster size distribution approach [21]; data from [29]
Avian influenza H5N1 – 2004 to 2006; SE Asia and Egypt/Turkey 0.52 to 0.54 [11] Bayesian approach
Swine influenza H3N2v - 2011, USA 0.5 to 0.74 Exposure-based approach [20]; data from [30]
Human influenza viruses
1918 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic 1.8 to 5.4 [16,18,31,32] Various approaches
1957 A/H2N2 influenza pandemic 1.5 [33] growth rate
1968 A/H3N2 influenza pandemic 1.5 [33] growth rate
2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic 1.2 to 3.1 [17,34-40] Various approaches
Seasonal influenza 1.3 [41,42] growth rate
Other zoonotic viruses
Nipah virus, Malaysia, 1990s 0.05 to 0.08 Exposure-based approach [20]; data from [43]
Nipah virus, Bangladesh, 2000s 0.48 to 0.51 Exposure-based and cluster size distribution approaches
[20]; to data from [21]
SARS virus, Singapore, Hong Kong, 2003 2.2 to 3.6 [15,44] Epidemic model fitted to case series during the
pre-intervention period
SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.
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(the hypothetical reservoir), which yields an upper R esti-
mate of 1–0.47 = 0.53.
An alternative R estimate is provided by the average
distribution of secondary chains of transmission. If we
assume that all three A/H7N9 clusters represents one
spillover event (primary case) followed by one to two
serial transmission events, we obtain R = 4/126 = 0.03.
Inclusion of one additional suspected cluster of size two
identified by contact tracing [see Additional file 1] re-
sults in a slightly higher estimate of R = 5/126 = 0.04.
Hence, information on individual-level exposure and
cluster size distribution indicates that R is approximately
0.03 to 0.53, consistent with the broad range of uncer-
tainty obtained in the Bayesian approach.
Comparison of transmissibility estimates between
influenza A/H7N9 and other zoonotic viruses
Table 2 presents a comparison of R for the A/H7N9
influenza virus, zoonotic influenza viruses, seasonal and
pandemic influenza viruses and other viruses of pan-
demic concern. Estimates are based on a variety of ap-
proaches, including transmission model fitting methods
and individual-level exposure history approaches (See
Additional file 1 for details).We compiled R estimates for zoonotic influenza
viruses that episodically cause human infections, in
particular for avian-origin A/H5N1 and swine-origin A/
H3N2v. Estimates in the range 0.52 to 0.54 have been
proposed for A/H5N1 in Thailand and Indonesia, based
on a Bayesian approach similar to that used here [11].
Using the ratio of secondary infections to primary cases
[29], we obtain R approximately 0.29 in this period of
relatively intense H5N1 activity.
The H3N2v swine-origin influenza virus has recently
become a cause of concern in the US, especially in the
context of agricultural fairs in 2011 and 2012. Informa-
tion on the proportion of patients with direct exposure
to swine [30] suggests that R is approximately 0.67.
Other approaches making more complex assumptions
about surveillance intensity and over-dispersion in the
distribution of secondary cases indicate that R is appro-
ximately 0.5 to 0.74 [20].
In the case of seasonal and pandemic influenza out-
breaks, model-fitting approaches reveal that R is 1.3 on
average for seasonal outbreaks [41,42] and 1.2 to 5.4 for
pandemic viruses, with the highest estimates associated
with the lethal 1918 pandemic [16-18,31-40] (Table 2).
Nipah virus is another emerging viral zoonosis worth
comparing to influenza A/H7N9 (Table 2). Early outbreaks
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transmission potential, as most cases had direct exposure
to swine, with R = 0.05 to 0.08 [43]. In contrast, more
recent outbreaks in Bangladesh in 2001 to 2007 were
characterized by a higher frequency of human-to-human
transmission, with R approximately 0.51 [20,21]. A similar
estimate was obtained by analyzing the cluster size distri-
bution [21].
Table 2 also provides data for the SARS outbreak in
2003, with an estimated R in the range 2.2 to 3.7 based
on fitting transmission models to the progression of
weekly cases before intervention took place [15,44].
Hence, taken together, the influenza A/H7N9 virus cur-
rently has relatively low estimated transmission potential
relative to other zoonotic viruses, although confidence
intervals are broad.
Discussion
We have provided near real-time estimates of the trans-
mission potential of the emerging A/H7N9 influenza
outbreak in China by applying different methodological
approaches to official notifications of laboratory-con-
firmed cases. Although there is relatively limited infor-
mation in the A/H7N9 case data at this point, all
available evidence points to R estimates well below 1.0
in Shanghai and Zhejiang provinces, where the majority
of cases have been reported. Instead, a deceleration in
growth rate in mid April is consistent with the effective-
ness of preemptive live bird market closures initiated in
early April. Comparison between A/H7N9 and other
zoonotic threats suggests a relatively low transmission
potential relative to that of other avian or swine influ-
enza viruses and recent Nipah viruses, although further
data are necessary to confirm this result.
Our Bayesian SEIR estimation approach assumes that all
infections originate from human-to-human transmission
and, hence, yields ‘worst-case scenario’ R estimates. Our
estimation framework was robust to assumptions about
the duration of the infectious and latent periods, whether
we considered a short serial interval characteristic of sea-
sonal influenza [25] or a prolonged disease course more
consistent with early case descriptions [4,26]. In contrast,
the Bayesian approach was very sensitive to assumptions
regarding the prior distribution of R, which dominated the
inference process. Using assumptions reasonably guided
by information on prior patient exposure and the fre-
quency of family clusters, this approach indicates a R well
below the epidemic threshold (R = 1.0) in Eastern China.
Further, simulation studies suggest that if the true R was
above 0.6, we would see a greater shift from prior to
posterior distributions than seen in the A/H7N9 data,
confirming the low transmission potential of this virus.
Alternative estimation approaches based on individual
level contact tracing and prior exposure suggest a rangeof R of 0.03 to 0.53, in line with a recent modeling study
analyzing the cluster size distribution of A/H7N9 cases
[22]. These low R estimates are consistent with the re-
sults of intense efforts by the Chinese health authorities
to monitor contacts of infected cases, which have so far
revealed only limited instances of secondary transmis-
sion [4]. While the occurrence of three (perhaps four)
family clusters of A/H7N9 cases is consistent with short
chains of human to human transmission, these clusters
do not rule out exposure to common environmental or
animal sources. Taken together, information from con-
tact surveys [4] and available R estimates are consistent
with a predominance of spillover events from a hypo-
thetical reservoir.
We observed a reduction in the growth rate of H7N9
cases in mid to late April, coinciding with the closure of
live bird markets in Shanghai, Zhejiang and large Chinese
cities in response to the evolving outbreak. The deceler-
ation in the growth rate was significant in our data as early
as 18 April, a period when the effectiveness of these
measures was still being debated [45]. Our model is ill-
equipped, however, to predict the progression of the
outbreak in the coming weeks if intervention measures
are relaxed [46], as information is lacking on the residual
prevalence of A/H7N9 in poultry populations in China.
Further, we cannot rule out a subsequent rise in A/H7N9
transmission potential in the coming months, as seasonal
factors could affect virus prevalence in the (presumed)
avian reservoir and promote avian-to-human and possibly
human-to-human transmission [47,48].
We have provided transmissibility estimates for influenza
A/H7N9 and other zoonoses using several approaches,
which rely on very different assumptions. The Bayesian
SEIR model-fitting approach is based on the progression of
case incidence; our analyses suggest that currently available
A/H7N9 data provide relatively limited information, so
that the inference process is heavily dependent on the
prior (see also more extreme priors in Additional file 1:
Figure S6). This likely stems from the small number of A/
H7N9 cases available for study (n = 70 in the two main
provinces), in part resulting from the low transmission po-
tential of A/H7N9. Simulations were particularly helpful
in showing that if the true R was above 0.6, then we would
have most likely identified a shift in the posterior distri-
bution. The lack of observed shift is further evidence that
R is low and most likely below 0.6.
In the context of subcritical outbreaks (R <1), alterna-
tive methods based on contact tracing and exposure
information are attractive, although they depend heavily
on prior knowledge of the ecology of the disease. These
methods rely on estimates of the proportions of cases
arising from human-to-human transmission versus direct
exposure to the reservoir [20,21] and, hence, assume that
the reservoir is well known and that onset dates and serial
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relying on cluster size distribution are more sensitive to
reporting schemes than growth rate methods (for example,
if clusters are more likely to be reported once a family
member is infected) [22].
Information regarding the reservoir of A/H7N9 and
the natural history of this disease is still limited, as
would be the case for any emerging zoonosis with
limited prior experience. It is intriguing that 23% of A/
H7N9 cases do not report any prior contact with poultry
(suggesting R is approximately 0.23), and yet clusters are
extremely infrequent (suggesting R closer to 0). These
conflicting findings could be reconciled with additional
information on the prevalence of asymptomatic infec-
tions; unfortunately, recent serological information is
currently lacking. Overall, all R estimation methods tend
to produce high uncertain ranges for A/H7N9. In a simi-
lar context, early estimates of the transmissibility of the
MERS-CoV virus using a related approach were relati-
vely broad, with confidence intervals ranging between
0.5 and 1.1 [49]. A quantitative comparison of the per-
formances of these approaches would be useful in the
future as these methods are increasingly applied to
characterize the pandemic potential of emerging patho-
gens (see also [22]).
This study is subject to limitations. First, A/H7N9
incidence could be underreported. However, serological
surveys conducted at the end of 2012 in China and
Vietnam revealed low levels of prior infections [50,51].
Moreover, influenza-like-illness surveillance suggests
that A/H7N9 infection was an uncommon cause of
illness in any age group during March and April 2013 in
the most affected areas of China [52]. Our estimates are
resilient to underreporting issues as long as the observed
case series closely tracks the true course of the outbreak.
If case detection had improved over time with increased
detection capabilities, this would have artificially quick-
ened the progression of reported cases and, in turn,
spuriously overestimated the epidemic growth rate and
R. Hence, because of likely increased sampling intensity
as the outbreak progressed, we can view our R estimates
as upper bounds of the true value.
Second, we have used a simple model to estimate R,
relying on a SEIR transmission model typically used for
human diseases, while in fact there is likely very little
transmission between humans. Our simulations suggest
that in the context of frequent spillover events arising
from a reservoir, our estimates of R are inflated (consistent
with providing worst-case scenarios of the true human-to-
human transmission potential of A/H7N9). However, our
approach accurately predicts whether an emerging
pathogen remains below the critical epidemic thresh-
old (R <1). A more refined approach could integrate
more information regarding the hypothetical reservoirand the probability of contacts with humans, and could
estimate the relative contribution of each component to
overall disease transmission. The yet unresolved nature of
the reservoir of A/H7N9 and its ecology hampers the
calibration of such models.
Third, our model assumes homogeneous mixing,
which may not be valid. We have focused on province-
specific data, which provides a better approximation of
well-mixed populations than nationally-aggregated data,
especially as most cases arose from large cities (espe-
cially Shanghai). Still, there could be residual spatial
heterogeneity, which may artificially decrease the esti-
mated R. Overall, our very generic model only requires
information on the date of symptoms onset and could
be applicable to a variety of emerging infections that
include spillovers from a putative reservoir and human-
to-human transmission.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have shown that the available epi-
demiological data on influenza A/H7N9 are consistent
with subcritical transmission potential below R = 0.6 in
the first three months of virus circulation in Shanghai
and Zhejiang provinces, suggesting infrequent human-
to-human transmission events. A decline in the growth
rate of influenza A/H7N9 cases in April 2013 highlights
the beneficial impact of live bird market closures. The
estimated transmission potential of A/H7N9 appears
lower than that of other zoonotic threats, although
uncertainty remains important due to limited statistical
information in the available data. Our proposed approach
could be useful to quantify the progression of the outbreak
and the impact of control measures in the coming months
and help monitor the pandemic potential of this emerging
pathogen in near real-time.
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